

## Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

### The Text:

We are using an annotated edition of the Dialogues (1713) from Jonathan Bennett’s **Early Modern Texts** (EMT) website. His site updates many philosophers to a more contemporary English. These versions tend to be easier to read and understand for modern readers.

My annotated version is [here](#).

[http://greg-goode.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Three-Dialogues-Part-1-Early-Modern-Texts\\_Annotated.pdf](http://greg-goode.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Three-Dialogues-Part-1-Early-Modern-Texts_Annotated.pdf)

This version has the additional outline and the section information. On the sections within each dialogue, I follow the lead from the printed edition by Colin M. Turbayne, MacMillan Publishing Company. First published in 1954, copyright renewed in 1985.

### What are they arguing about?

**Hylas** (the materialist) argues that physical substance exists in an objective way, whether or not it is perceived by a mind. Physical substance, according to the various theories he offers, is the original of which our ideas are pictures. Or it is the archetype or explanation for our ideas. **Philonous** (the immaterialist) counters each argument by showing how supposed physical substance already is an idea.

Throughout the three dialogs, they make progress. Hylas comes to agree with Philonous.

- **At the end of the FIRST dialogue:** Hylas is silenced, though not convinced. He has run out of arguments.
- **At the end of the SECOND dialogue:** Hylas is himself reduced to a state of skepticism.
- **At the end of the THIRD dialogue:** Hylas comes to agree with Philonous’ immaterialism.

### About this Guide

The Study Guide is a big table with selected quotes from the text on the left, with commentary on the right. The commentary is not scholarly or historical. Rather, it is designed to help those doing nondual inquiry, especially for topics relating to physicality and objectivity.

## Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

We feel that objects exist separately and independently of awareness. This conception we have causes feelings of separation and alienation. This conception is also the root of the “container metaphor,” according to which we think of the mind and even awareness itself, as containers with thoughts other objects literally “inside” of them. For the first several decades of my life, I felt this way. Consequently, I used to feel separate and alienated from things and people. This way of thinking and feeling even affected my relationships with other people. Even romantic relationships! And it went on for years until I looked into it.

Berkeley was not an Advaitin or nondualist. He doesn’t have a notion of global awareness that matches nonduality’s notion. But he does come pretty close. He relies on the notion of God’s mind, from which (he says) all ideas are communicated to us. According to Berkeley, an idea or sensible quality may not appear to **my** mind, but if it exists at all, it must appear at least to **God’s** mind. For Berkeley, there is no object that isn’t some kind of idea, and an idea cannot exist in **no** mind. This is the basis of Berkeley’s famous dictum, “*esse est percipi*.” And when discussing minds, he expands his dictum: “*esse est percipi (aut percipere)*.” “To be is to be perceived (or to perceive).” In other words, for something to exist, it must be an idea or a mind.

### How to use this Guide

I would recommend reading the [text of the first dialogue](#) over quickly. Then come back to it and read it along with this Study Guide. This Guide lists only the major sections and arguments in the first dialogue. It does not contain every paragraph. So you will have to use the two documents together.

For some people, it may be more convenient to work from printed copies. For others, online copies may be preferred. Whether you use printed or online versions, use both documents together.

### The other two Dialogues

The second Dialogue is about the cause of our ideas. This is important, because one of Hylas’s hidden assumptions, even in the first Dialogue, is that materialism must be true because there is no other way to explain our experiences. So the second Dialogue explores the notion of God as the cause of our ideas. This was easier in 1713 than it would be today, because both Hylas and Philonous were theists who agreed on many things about God.

## Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

Today, the theological notion of God is not as popular. But inquirers in nonduality have a concept that is roughly analogous: global awareness, to which all things appear, and which serves as the nature of all things. So modern readers who use these dialogues in support of nondual inquiry can substitute “consciousness” or “awareness” for “God,” and the arguments will be more intuitive.

The third Dialogue is a collection of critiques against Hylas’ (Berkeley’s) immaterialist philosophy. Berkeley was aware of many different objections to his theory, and listed the strongest objections in the third Dialogue.

I have listed a [Synopsis of the Second Dialogue](#) and a [Synopsis of the Third Dialogue](#) at the end of this Study Guide.

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|------------------|------|---|---|
| <b>Section 1</b> |      |   |   |
| 1                | 1    | <p><b>Hylas:</b> It is indeed somewhat unusual: but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was talking about last night that I couldn't sleep, so I decided to get up and walk in the garden.</p> <p><b>Philonous:</b> That's good! It gives you a chance to see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom on the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret raptures. But I'm afraid I am interrupting your thoughts; for you seemed very intent on something.</p> | <p><b>Hylas</b> is the materialist, the one who believes in the objective existence of physical substance and physical properties that exist independently of all minds. <b>Philonous</b> is the "idealist," arguing that what we perceive is ideas, not external objects.</p> <p>But notice that it's Philonous who is more in touch with things. He is in intimate touch with things, the season, the sky, the birds, trees and flowers. Hylas is lost in thought!</p> <p>This illustrates part of Berkeley's argument that his philosophy makes the world immediate (what nonduality would call "direct") for us. If we were to believe, like Hylas, that the true world is made of unthinking, inert substance that can't be seen, then we would end up feeling separated from it. This sense of separation is inherent in what Philonous calls "scepticism."</p>   |
| 1                | 1    | <p><b>Hyl:</b> I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, through a desire to mark themselves off from the common people or through heaven knows what trick of their thought, claimed either to believe nothing at all or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This wouldn't matter so much if their paradoxes and scepticism didn't bring consequences that are bad for mankind in general.</p>   | <p>This early part of the dialogue establishes a motive for our looking into Berkeley's ideas. Why should we be interested in them? He positions his philosophy as an antidote to skepticism (Jonathan Bennett spells it "scepticism").</p> <p>Scepticism functions as a bargaining chip in this part of the discussion.</p> <p>Hylas and Philonous agree upon this: neither one wants to be branded a skeptic." For this reason, each of them is arguing that his philosophy is further from skepticism.</p> <p>In the 17<sup>th</sup> Century, skepticism had a less favorable reputation than it has now. Back then, religion was still a powerful force in society, , skepticism was associated with atheism and the lack of moral or intellectual standards. Very few people wanted to be thought a skeptic. But today, skepticism is associated with science, and even with the idea that the scientific approach is truer than any alternative account of the world.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|---------|------|---|---|
| 1       | 1    | <b>Phil:</b> I entirely agree with you about the bad effects of the paraded doubts of some philosophers and the fantastical views of others. I have felt this so strongly in recent times that I have dropped some of the high-flown theories I had learned in their universities, replacing them with ordinary common opinions. Since this revolt of mine against metaphysical notions and in favour of the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I swear that I find I can think ever so much better, so that I can now easily understand many things which previously were mysteries and riddles. | Philonous is positioning his philosophy as common sense, an approach to life that follows the dictates of nature. This is another motivating idea. Most people don't want a high-flown metaphysical theory.   |
| 1       | 1    | <b>Phil:</b> I seriously believe that there is no such thing as what philosophers call 'material substance'; but if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, then I would have the same reason to renounce this belief as I think I have now to reject the contrary opinion.  | Philonous is arguing against physical substance. He sees belief in it to cause more skepticism than a lack of belief in it. Why? Because the kind of physical substance that people thought existed objectively in Berkeley's time was something that we couldn't perceive directly, but only through its effects on us, that is, through our sensory impressions. It was thought that the idea of physical substance was needed, or else there could be nothing that would explain our experience.<br><br>This physical substance was at once thought to be real, and also to be imperceivable.<br><br>If we can perceive ideas, but not the external substance that we imagine is needed to cause them, then we are forced into skepticism about whether our ideas and interpretations about physical substance are true. |
| 1       | 2    | <b>Hyl:</b> What! can anything be more fantastical, more in conflict with common sense, or a more obvious piece of scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as <i>matter</i> ?  | Of course Hylas thinks that Philonous is the skeptic because Philonous doesn't believe in matter.<br><br>They go back and forth about skepticism for a while. They end up on p. 2 agreeing that skepticism is the distrust of the senses, the denial of sensible things. This allows them to go on to examine just what sensible things are. Is the sensible thing the hot external object that is sensed (as Hylas says)? Or is it the feeling of painful heat (as Philonous says)?  |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text  | Comment  |
|------------------|------|---|--|
| <b>Section 2</b> |      |   |  |
| 2                | 3    | <p><b>Phil:</b> Well, then, let us see which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or claims to have the greatest ignorance of them; since, if I understand you rightly, he is to be counted the greater sceptic.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> That is what I desire.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> What do you mean by ‘sensible things’?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Things that are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else?</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I’m sorry, but it may greatly shorten our enquiry if I have a clear grasp of your notions. Bear with me, then, while I ask you this further question. Are things ‘perceived by the senses’ only the ones that are perceived immediately? Or do they include things that are perceived mediately, that is, through the intervention of something else?</p> | <p>Neither person wants to be in the position of denying the reality of sensible things.</p> <p>But just what <b>IS</b> a sensible thing? Defining sensible things is a key part of Philonous’ argument.</p> <p>Hylas starts out thinking that the sensible thing is the external object like a tree. This is still the common-sense view. We think that what we perceive is the tree.</p> <p>But then Philonous asks,</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> “Are things ‘perceived by the senses’ only the ones that are perceived immediately? Or do they include things that are perceived mediately, that is, through the intervention of something else?”</p> <p>This is one of Philonous’ most important concepts – the different between <b>immediate</b> perception and <b>mediate</b> perception.</p> <p>If you are used to nondual inquiry, you may be more familiar with the distinction “direct experience” versus “indirect” or “inferential” experience. You can make the substitutions. Berkeley’s terms are on the left, nonduality terms on the right:</p> <p><b>immediate</b> perception = <b>direct</b> experience<br/> <b>mediate</b> perception = <b>inferential</b> experience</p> <p>They begin the discussion of this distinction by considering things like virtue, God, truth. No one claims that they are sensible things like trees or rocks. If we read about virtue or truth, we <b>immediately</b> perceive the colors and shapes of the text. We <b>mediately</b> perceive (or understand) virtue and truth thereby.</p> <p>Hylas and Philonous agree on this. Later Philonous gets Hylas to agree that causes of our perceptions (e.g. sounds or the color of the sky) are not immediately perceived.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text   | Comment  |
|------------------|------|--|--|
|                  |      |  | Hylas soon says that we infer the existence of causes based on the sensible things we do perceive.   |
| 2-3              | 3    | <p><b>Phil:</b> We agree, then, that sensible things include only things that are immediately perceived by sense. Now tell me whether we immediately perceive by sight anything besides light, colours, and shapes; by hearing anything but sounds; by the palate anything besides tastes; by the sense of smell anything besides odours; by touch anything more than tangible qualities.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> We do not.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So it seems that if you take away all sensible qualities there is nothing left that is sensible.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I agree.</p>                   | <p>Hylas is now admitting that all we perceive are sense data such as colors, sounds, shapes, etc. If you are accustomed to nonduality vocabulary, you can substitute terms as follows. Berkeley’s terms are on the left, nonduality terms on the right:</p> <p>sense data = arisings or appearances<br/>           colors, sounds, shapes, odors = arisings or appearances</p> <p>Even though Hylas admits that there is nothing sensible left at the physical object when you take away all sensible qualities, he will backslide from this admission throughout the dialogue. He will continue to assume that what we immediately perceive is the tree itself.</p> <p>Right now, however, he is following Philonous pretty well.</p>  |
| <b>Section 3</b> |      |  |  |
| 3                | 4    | <p><b>Phil:</b> Does the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived? or is it something different from their being perceived—something that doesn’t involve the mind?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I am talking only about sensible things. My question is: By the ‘real existence’ of one of them do you mean an existence exterior to the mind and distinct from their being perceived?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I mean a real absolute existence—distinct from, and having no relation to, their being perceived.</p> | <p>Hylas wants to distinguish between existing and being perceived. He argues that there is a “real,” “absolute” kind of existence, which has no relation to what we perceive. And this kind of existence, he says, is outside the mind. He makes the distinction in several different ways. Over the rest of this section (up to p. 12 or so), Philonous counters these arguments with two main responses:</p> <p>The qualities they agreed to discuss are sensible qualities, not qualities that by definition cannot be sensed,</p> <p>Arguments from perceptual relativity, which demonstrate that what appears red, yellow, bitter, sweet, etc., to us depends on the perceiver. Is the perceiver a human, animal, in good health or ill, close to the object or far from it? These relational properties are so important that Hylas is simply not justified in saying that bitterness, sweetness or color exist unseen in the object.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text   | Comment  |
|---------|------|--|--|
| 3       | 4    | <p><b>Phil:</b> So if heat is granted to have a real existence, it must exist outside the mind.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It must.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally possible for all degrees of heat that we feel; or is there a reason why we should attribute it to some degrees of heat and not to others? If there is, please tell me what it is.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense we can be sure exists also in the object that occasions it.</p> | <p>Philonous begins by suggesting an example: heat. Hylas says that whatever degree of heat we perceive, that same degree of heat exists outside the mind as well as in our mind as a perception.</p> <p>So Hylas has actually gone back on his earlier admission that sensible things exist only in the mind. He is now suggesting a kind of double or mirrored existence, where the quality exists (1) in the object and it is mirrored by also existing (2) in the mind.</p> <p>According to Hylas, heat exists both in the mind and in the object.</p>   |
| 3       | 4    | <p><b>Phil:</b> But isn't the most fierce and intense degree of heat a very great pain?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> No-one can deny that.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> And can any unperceiving thing have pain or pleasure?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Certainly not.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Is your material substance a senseless thing or does it have sense and perception?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It is senseless, without doubt.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So it can't be the subject of pain.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Indeed it can't.</p>           | <p>Philonous thinks of a very clever example: pain. Hylas admits that pain can't exist in the object.</p> <p>Philonous then tries to say that pain=very intense heat. His argument goes like this:</p> <p>(1) Burning pain doesn't exist outside the mind because it is a sensation within us.<br/>                 (2) Burning pain = intense heat.<br/>                 (3) Therefore intense heat doesn't exist outside the mind.</p> <p>Hylas replies to this argument by rejecting premise (2). He says instead that heat is in the physical object and pain is the result of the heat. In the dialogue, Hylas makes his point in several ways that the sensations can be in us, but their causes are in the object. This is what we think nowadays as well. In this exchange on p. 4, Hylas also wants to say that even as experienced, pain is one thing and heat is another.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment  |
|---------|------|---|--|
|         |      |   | <p>Philonous says that when we feel the feeling of painful heat, there is only one idea present, not two. A later judgement might claim that the heat and pain are two things. But as it occurs, it occurs as as one idea in us.</p> <p>This isn't Philonous' strongest argument. And ultimately it isn't accepted by Hylas. Philonous is trying to find reasons acceptable to Hylas that the sensible quality (heat) is not in the object, so he argues that it is pain. He is counting on the hope that Hylas won't say that pain exists in the object.</p> <p>Hylas goes on to argue on pages 5 and 6 that there are milder degrees of temperature that are not associated with pleasure or pain. So Hylas tries to block Philonous' "heat=pain" argument and force him to deal with temperature alone.</p> |
| 3       | 6    | <p><b>Phil:</b> Can any doctrine be true if it necessarily leads to absurdity?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Certainly not.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Isn't it an absurdity to think that a single thing should be at the same time both cold and warm?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It is.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Well, now, suppose that one of your hands is hot and the other cold, and that they are both at once plunged into a bowl of water that has a temperature between the two. Won't the water seem cold to one hand and warm to the other?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It will.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Then doesn't it follow by your principles that the water really is both cold and warm at the same time—thus believing something that you agree to be an absurdity?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I admit that that seems right.</p> | <p>This is one of Philonous' stronger arguments. It is an ancient argument that holds that hot and cold depend on the perceiver.</p> <p>Hylas is saying that our sensible ideas are in us because they are in the object, and then caused to be in us.</p> <p>Philonous replies that this leads to absurdity. If I do the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) soak one hand in hot water and another hand in cold water at the same time,</li> <li>(2) place both hands in a bowl water at room temperature,</li> <li>(3) then, following Hylas' argument, I must conclude that the same water is BOTH hot and cold.</li> </ol> <p>That conclusion is absurd, so Hylas gives up his theory that heat and cold exist in the object.</p>   |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text   | Comment   |
|---------|------|--|---|
| 3       | 7    | <p><b>Phil:</b> But what will you say, Hylas, if it turns out that the same argument applies with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that none of them can be supposed to exist outside the mind, any more than heat and cold can?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Proving that would be quite a feat, but I see no chance of your doing so.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Let us examine the other sensible qualities in order. What about tastes? Do you think they exist outside the mind, or not?</p>  | <p>In the following pages, Philonous goes on to examine taste, smell, sound, etc. He will make use of the arguments about perceptual relativity. How things appear differs according to health, species, position and angle, and person to person. Therefore, it doesn't follow that a sensible quality in the mind corresponds to a matching quality existing in the object.</p>   |
| 3       | 7    | <p><b>Hyl:</b> Hold on, Philonous! Now I see what has deluded me all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, are particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which I answered simply that they are. I should have answered by making a distinction: those qualities as perceived by us are pleasures or pains, but as existing in the external objects they are not. So we cannot conclude without qualification that there is no heat in the fire or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness as perceived by us are not in the fire or the sugar. What do you say to this?</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I say it is irrelevant. We were talking only about 'sensible things', which you defined as things we immediately perceive by our senses. Whatever other qualities you are talking about have no place in our conversation, and I don't know anything about them. You may indeed claim to have discovered certain qualities that you don't perceive, and assert that they exist in fire and sugar; but I can't for the life of me see how that serves your side in the argument we were having. Tell me then once more, do you agree that heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness (meaning the qualities that are perceived by the senses), don't exist outside the mind?</p> | <p>Hylas returns to a type of distinction that he has been relying on the whole time – between sensible qualities as they exist in us, and their supposedly objective correlates, which exist in the object.</p> <p>Philonous replies that it is irrelevant, because the subject under discussion is <b>sensible</b> qualities. But the qualities that Hylas specifies that exist in the object proposing exist in the object are by definition <b>not sensible</b>.</p> <p>Hylas is arguing:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Heat as perceived by me exists in me.</li> <li>(2) There is also heat as existing in the external object.</li> <li>(3) The two aspects of heat match each other.</li> </ol> <p>Philonous argues that we don't know anything about (2) or (3), can't say anything about them, that the discussion is about sensible qualities.</p> <p>This might seem like a dodge on the part of Philonous. It is a subtle way of assigning the burden of proof to Hylas to demonstrate (2) and (3).</p> <p>In fact, Hylas doesn't have any direct evidence for (2) or (3). Why does he offer them as external counterparts to our perceptions? As we'll see later in the dialogue (p. 14), Hylas has an overall reason. Basically, it's this. If we don't posit some kind of external counterpart to our sensible ideas, then (a) we won't know how to explain our experiences. And (b) too many "odd consequences" would</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment  |
|---------|------|---|--|
|         |      |   | follow. So in order to avoid (a) and (b), Hylas insists upon (1) and (2). This is really his underlying argument in this first dialogue.   |
| 3       | 8    | <p><b>Hyl:</b> This motion in the external air is what produces in the mind the sensation of sound. By striking on the ear-drum it causes a vibration which is passed along the auditory nerves to the brain, whereon the mind experiences the sensation called sound.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> What! is sound a sensation?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> As I said: as perceived by us it is a particular sensation in the mind.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> And can any sensation exist outside the mind?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> No, certainly.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> But if sound is a sensation, how can it exist in the air, if by ‘the air’ you mean a senseless substance existing outside the mind?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Philonous, you must distinguish sound as it is perceived by us from sound as it is in itself; or—in other words—distinguish the sound we immediately perceive from the sound that exists outside us. The former is indeed a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibration in the air.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I thought I had already flattened that distinction by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a similar case before. But I’ll let that pass. Are you sure, then, that sound is really nothing but motion?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I am.</p> | <p>Hylas begins to argue that sound as it exists outside of us is really motion and vibration in the air. It impinges upon the auditory nerves into the brain, and the experiences the sensation called sound. This is very close to what most people think today.</p> <p>Hylas goes back and forth between saying that vibration IS the real version of the sound we hear, and that vibration CAUSES the sound we hear.</p> <p>Philonous asks about vibration, which is motion, and to which senses motion belongs. Hylas says motion belongs to the senses of sight and touch. Philonous says that this commits Hylas to claiming that <b>real sound is not heard, but seen and touched!</b> This is an absurd consequence of Hylas’ objectivist argument. Hylas would then lose out in the contest with Philonous for common sense.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|------------------|------|---|---|
|                  |      | <p><b>Phil:</b> Whatever is true of real sound, therefore, can truthfully be said of motion.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It may.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So it makes sense to speak of motion as something that is loud, sweet, piercing, or low-pitched!</p>  |   |
| <b>Section 4</b> |      |   |   |
| 4                | 12   | <p><b>Hyl:</b> I have to admit, Philonous, that I can’t keep this up any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes—in a word, all that are termed ‘secondary qualities’—have no existence outside the mind. But in granting this I don’t take anything away from the reality of matter or external objects, because various philosophers maintain what I just did about secondary qualities and yet are the far from denying matter. [In this context, ‘philosophers’ means ‘philosophers and scientists’.] To make this clearer: philosophers divide sensible qualities into primary and secondary. •Primary qualities are extendedness, shape, solidity, gravity, motion, and rest. They hold that these really exist in bodies. •Secondary qualities are all the sensible qualities that aren’t primary; and the philosophers assert that these are merely sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. No doubt you are already aware of all this. For my part, I have long known that such an opinion was current among philosophers, but I was never thoroughly convinced of its truth till now.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So you still believe that extension and shapes are inherent in external unthinking substances? [Here ‘extension’ could mean ‘extendedness’ or it could mean ‘size’.]</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I do.</p> | <p>Hylas proposes the distinction between <b>primary qualities (PQ)</b> and <b>secondary qualities (SQ)</b>. The theory goes like this:</p> <p><b>PQ:</b> PQs exist in objects themselves. The qualities include extendedness, shape, solidity, gravity, motion and rest. Hylas doesn’t say this, but sometimes PQ are called “common sensibles.”</p> <p><b>SQ:</b> SQs are only ideas in the mind. They include colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and any quality not mentioned among the PQ above. SQs are basically all the “sensible qualities” that Philonous always talks about. Hylas doesn’t say this, but sometimes PQ are called “proper sensibles,” where a quality is “appropriate” or “proper” to be perceived by just one particular sense.</p> <p>For the nonduality inquirer, the PQ/SQ distinction is relevant. SQ are sense-dependent, each quality being perceived by only one sense at a time. They are easier to understand as not objective. But the PQ seem to be more general, and able to be perceived by more than one sense. <b>It seems that we can see extendedness and also touch it.</b> If that’s really true, if a quality can really be perceived by more than one sense, then that quality seems more independent and objective than if it were sense-dependent. It has a greater “reality effect” that way. We have only five perceiving senses (according to the ordinary meaning of the word). It makes us wonder how many objects are really “out there” that we aren’t able to see as human beings. This kind of thinking may add to a person’s sense of separation and alienation.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|---------|------|---|---|
|         |      |   | <p>But in Section 4, Philonous will go on to argue that the same sensory-relativity arguments that apply to SQs (which were dealt with in Section 3) also apply to PQs.</p>   |
| 4       | 14   | <p><b>Hyl:</b> I don't know how to maintain it, yet I am reluctant to give up extension [= 'size'], because I see so many odd consequences following from the concession that extension isn't in the outer object.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Odd, you say? After the things you have already agreed to, I hope you won't be put off from anything just because it is odd! But in any case wouldn't it seem very odd if the general reasoning that covers all the other sensible qualities didn't apply also to extension? If you agree that no idea or anything like an idea can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no shape or mode of extension [= 'or specific way of being extended'] that we can have any idea of—in perceiving or imagining—can be really inherent in matter. Whether the sensible quality is shape or sound or colour or what you will, it seems impossible that any of these should subsist in something that doesn't perceive it. (Not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension, to be the substratum of extension. I'll say more about that shortly.)</p> | <p>This is actually Hylas' hidden premise. Qualities such as extendedness must be external and objectively existent in bodies, or else too many “odd” consequences would follow. It's not that he has other good proofs for objectivity. It's just that he doesn't know how else we would explain our experience.</p> <p>Philonous responds by saying that what's really odd is to say that any quality exists in a substance that can't perceive it (saying that qualities do exist unseen in an external physical object is Hylas' official position).</p> <p>Right here, Philonous asks, “Why should extendedness be different from all the other qualities? He has gotten Hylas to acquiesce that no sensible quality can exist apart from a mind to which it appears.</p> <p>How does Philonous explain our experience? For Philonous, “<i>esse est percipi (aut percipere)</i>” –to be is to be perceived (or to perceive). In Dialogues 2 and 3, he argues that all our ideas come from God's mind to our minds. An object such as an orange or a table can exist outside of my <b>particular</b> mind, Philonous will argue. It doesn't need to be in my mind (and this is how Philonous avoids solipsism). But the quality must exist in at least <b>one</b> mind in order to be perceived. So at least God's mind has to have the idea. Philonous argues in the later Dialogues that because of “<i>esse ist percipi</i>” and because God is omniscient, any quality that exists must be perceived by God.</p> <p>Nowadays this argument of Philonous' sounds outlandish. But for the nondual inquirer, this claim is analogous to the nonduality teaching that says all phenomena come from (or arise to or are witnessed by) consciousness.</p> |
| 4       | 16   | <p><b>Phil:</b> Can you even separate the ideas of extendedness and motion from the ideas of all the so-called secondary qualities?</p>   | <p>Hylas is saying that the PQ's such as extendedness are in the object. Philonous is asking about how the idea of extendedness comes to us. It is always accompanied by one of the SQ, which Hylas has already agreed are in us.</p> <p>Philonous is saying that we can't even conceive of pure extendedness (or motion or other PQ) without some kind of SQ. For example, wherever we perceive</p>  |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text  | Comment  |
|------------------|------|---|--|
|                  |      | <p><b>Hyl:</b> What! isn't it easy to consider extendedness and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Isn't that how the mathematicians handle them?</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I acknowledge, Hylas, that it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about extendedness and motion, without mentioning any other qualities, and in that sense to treat them abstractedly. I can pronounce the word 'motion' by itself, but how does it follow from this that I can form in my mind the idea of motion without an idea of body? Theorems about extension and shapes can be proved without any mention of large or small or any other sensible quality, but how does it follow from this that the mind can form and grasp an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or shape or other sensible quality? Mathematicians study quantity, disregarding any other sensible qualities that go with it on the grounds that they are irrelevant to the proofs. But when they lay aside the words and contemplate the bare ideas, I think you'll find that they aren't the pure abstracted ideas of extendedness.</p> | <p>extendedness or motion or shape, we also perceive an SQ such as color or some tactile sensation. What is a PQ by itself, stripped away from all SQs?</p> <p>Hylas says that mathematicians talk about PQ's in and of themselves. Philonous agrees that we can use the word by itself, and construct theorems that mention one of the PQs without entailing the SQs. But that doesn't mean that as "bare ideas" or as sensible qualities the PQs exist external to mind and separate from SQs.</p> |
| <b>Section 5</b> |      |   |  |
| 4/5              | 17   | <p><b>Hyl:</b> You needn't say any more about this. I freely admit—unless there has been some hidden error or oversight in our discussion up to here—that all sensible qualities should alike be denied existence outside the mind. But I fear that I may have been too free in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy in your line of argument. In short, I didn't take time to think.</p>  | <p>At the end of Section 4, Hylas comes to agree with Philonous, that no sensible qualities exist outside the mind.</p>  |
| 5                | 17   | <p><b>Hyl:</b> I think it was a big oversight on my part that I failed to distinguish sufficiently the object from the sensation. The</p>   | <p>But Hylas still insists upon something objective. This time, he wants to distinguish the "act" of perception, which is in the mind, from the "object" of perception, which he says is in the object.</p>  |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|---------|------|---|---|
|         |      | <p>sensation cannot exist outside the mind, but it doesn't follow that the object cannot either.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> What object do you mean? The object of the senses?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Exactly.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So it is immediately perceived?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Right.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Explain to me the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I take the sensation to be an act of the perceiving mind; beside which, there is something perceived, which I call the object of the act. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip, but the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.</p> |   |
| 5       | 17   | <p><b>Phil:</b> That the colours are really in the tulip which I see, is obvious. Nor can it be denied that this tulip may exist independently of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the senses—that is, any idea or combination of ideas—should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an obvious contradiction. Nor can I imagine how it follows from what you said just now, namely that the red and yellow are in the tulip you saw, since you don't claim to see that unthinking substance.</p>   | <p>Here, Philonous asks Hylas just what external thing is in. Is the color “in” the tulip? What tulip does Hylas mean? Is there any tulip other than the qualities that we perceive? Basically, Philonous is saying that Hylas doesn't have a right to use the “tulip” as an external object that possesses color, because everything we know about the tulip is color, texture, etc. What is it that Hylas is attributing the color <i>to</i>?</p> |
| 5       | 18   | <p><b>Phil:</b> Well, then, since in the actual perception of light and colours you are altogether passive, what has become of that action that you said was an ingredient in every sensation? And doesn't it follow from your own concessions that the perception of light and colours—which doesn't involve any</p>   | <p>On this page is a long argument led by Philonous that refutes Hylas' idea that perception is an act of mind. Philonous says that we can act and use volition when we position ourselves or turn our eyes in order to perceive, the actual moment of perception is passive. Whether we see white or red is not an act of will. Therefore, perception cannot be an act, as in Hylas' latest theory.</p>  |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text   | Comment   |
|------------------|------|--|---|
|                  |      | action—can exist in an unperceiving substance? And isn’t this a plain contradiction?   |   |
| <b>Section 6</b> |      |  |   |
| 6                | 19   | <b>Hyl:</b> I admit, Philonous, that when I look carefully at •what goes on in my mind, all I can find is that I am a thinking being that has a variety of sensations; and I can’t conceive how a sensation could exist in an unperceiving substance. But when on the other hand I look in a different way at •sensible things, considering them as so many properties and qualities, I find that I have to suppose a material substratum, without which they can’t be conceived to exist. | Hylas proposes that there must be a physical substratum that underlies the sensible qualities. There must be something for the qualities to belong to, something for us to attribute them to. This is a classic Western dualism, substance/attribute.   |
| 6                | 19   | <b>Hyl:</b> I don’t claim to have any proper •positive idea of it. [Here ‘positive’ means ‘non-relational’: Hylas means that he doesn’t have an idea that represents what material substance is like in itself.] But I conclude that it exists, because qualities can’t be conceived to exist without a support.   | Hylas reveals another instance of his hidden assumption, that even though we have no direct evidence that externality and objectivity exist, we need them because otherwise we wouldn’t be able to explain our experience.<br><br>This idea comes up a lot in nondual inquiry. And I find that Berkeley is very helpful in this section.<br><br>What Hylas is proposing here is an unseen material substance or essence of a thing. This substance is: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>external</b> (outside our perceptions)</li> <li>• <b>objective</b> (exists independently of the mind)</li> <li>• <b>unseen</b> (we don’t see it; we merely see the qualities that belong to it)</li> </ul> |
| 6                | 19   | <b>Phil:</b> So it seems that you have only a •relative notion of material substance: you conceive it only by conceiving how it relates to sensible qualities.<br><br><b>Hyl:</b> Right.   | This is an important exchange. Philonous is arguing that Hylas’ idea of material substance as a substratum is incoherent. It begs the question and also leads to an infinite regress.   |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text   | Comment   |
|---------|------|--|---|
|         |      | <p><b>Phil:</b> Tell me, please, what that relation is.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Isn't it sufficiently expressed in the term 'substratum' or 'substance'? [One is Latin, and means 'underneath layer'; the other comes from Latin meaning 'standing under'.]</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> If so, the word 'substratum' should mean that it is spread under the sensible qualities.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> True.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> And consequently ·spread· under extendedness.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I agree.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So in its own nature it is entirely distinct from extendedness.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> I tell you, extendedness is only a quality, and matter is something that supports qualities. And isn't it obvious that the supported thing is different from the supporting one?</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So something distinct from extendedness, and not including it, is supposed to be the substratum of extendedness.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Just so.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Tell me, Hylas, can a thing be spread without being extended? Isn't the idea of extendedness necessarily included in ·that of· spreading?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It is.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> So anything that you suppose to be spread under something else must have in itself an extendedness distinct from the extendedness of the thing under which it is spread.</p> | <p>For this substratum to support any qualities, it must “stand under” them or “hold them up” (i.e., support), or “spread itself out” so that the qualities will have a place to stand. But all these are themselves physical metaphors that can't be taken literally the way Hylas wants them to be taken. And why can't Hylas take them literally? Because to do so would be for Hylas to assume the very conclusion he wants to prove: the supposed objectivity of material substance.</p> <p>Hylas is “smuggling concepts.” He is attributing PQs to the internal nature of material substance in his argument to show that material substance is separate from the PQs and prior to them as a support.</p> <p>Hylas gets trapped in an infinite regress when he says that material substance is spread out under extendedness. This “spreading” is itself another case of extendedness. And then he would need to explain what spreads itself under the <b>first</b> spreading, and then <b>that</b> spreading, etc.</p> <p>This argument continues until the end of Section 6 on p. 20.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section          | Page | Text  | Comment   |
|------------------|------|---|---|
| <b>Section 7</b> |      |   |   |
| 7                | 21   | <p><b>Phil:</b> Tell me, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> No, that would be a contradiction.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> It is.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you.</p>                          | <p>This is a topic familiar to students of nondualism. Hylas wants to say that a tree can exist outside of all minds whatsoever. Philonous says that such a thing can't even be conceived of. Because the very attempt to posit the existence of "a tree that is not conceived of by any mind" conceives of it right there and then.</p>                              |
| <b>Section 8</b> |      |   |   |
| 8                | 22   | <p><b>Phil:</b> By no means. Neither eyesight nor reason inform you that the idea or thing that you immediately perceive actually exists outside the mind. By eyesight you know only that you are affected with certain sensations of light and colours, etc. And you won't say that these are outside the mind.</p>  | <p>This is another important and familiar idea for students of nondualism. Distance is not immediately perceived. In fact, no experience of an arising object in direct experience establishes that any object exists independently.</p> <p>Distance and externality seem to be visual objects, but there are not. There is nothing specific that they look like.</p> |
| <b>Section 9</b> |      |   |   |
| 9                | 23   | <p><b>Hyl:</b> To tell you the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects: one kind perceived immediately, and called 'ideas'; the other kind are real things or external objects perceived by the mediation of ideas, which resemble and represent them. Now I grant that ideas don't exist outside the mind; but the second sort of objects do. I am sorry I didn't think of this</p> | <p>Hylas tries again to come up with a distinction that allows ideas in us, versus something real existing in the external object. His new distinction is an a "picture" or "archetype" theory. That is, he suggests that the ideas in us are pictures or resemblances or representations of real things existing outside the mind.</p>                               |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text   | Comment  |
|---------|------|--|--|
|         |      | <p>distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Are those external objects perceived by •sense, or by •some other faculty?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> They are perceived by sense.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> What? Is there anything perceived by sense that isn't immediately perceived?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Yes, Philonous, there is—in a way. For example, when I look at a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said to perceive him in a fashion (though not immediately) by my senses.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> You seem to hold, then, that our ideas, which are all that we immediately perceive, are pictures of external things; and that the latter are also perceived by sense because they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas.</p>   | <p>So the sensible qualities of Julius Caesar are in the mind and <b>immediately perceived</b>, whereas the Roman emperor is <b>mediately perceived</b>. That is, perceived through the mediation of memory, reflection, inference, etc.</p> <p>This is another familiar type of belief, common even today. We think that our ideas are pictures or representations of things outside the mind.</p>  |
| 9       | 24   | <p><b>Phil:</b> So that example of yours doesn't show that anything is perceived by sense that isn't immediately perceived. I don't deny that we can be said in a certain sense to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is when the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, of a kind that have often been perceived to go with ideas of the former kind. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, all that I immediately perceive is the sound; but from my past experience that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to 'hear the coach'. Still, it is obvious that in truth and strictness nothing can be heard but sound; and the coach in that example is not strictly perceived by sense but only suggested from experience. Similarly, when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not</p> | <p>This is an important reply by Philonous. He is not denying that mediation happens. He's just denying that mediation proves that anything exists outside of the mind.</p> <p>The way mediation happens is that we see certain colors and hear certain sounds that suggest a certain person. In a mediated way, it's OK to say that we perceive that person. But it works without the need to believe in mind-independent objects.</p> <p>Our mediation may predict that we will see or hear further sensible qualities that we associate with that particular person. But in no case does this mediation establish that the qualities or the person exist outside the mind.</p> <p>For the student of nonduality, this is a hint about how we can function without beliefs in objects existing outside of awareness.</p> |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section           | Page  | Text   | Comment   |
|-------------------|-------|--|---|
|                   |       | <p>the objects of sight, but are suggested to the imagination by the colour and shape that are strictly perceived by that sense.</p> <p>In short, the only things that are actually and strictly perceived by any sense are the ones that would have been perceived even if we had only just acquired that sense and were using it for the first time. As for other things, clearly they are only suggested to the mind by past experience. But to return to your comparison of imperceptible ‘real things’ with Caesar’s picture: obviously, if you keep to this you’ll have to hold that the real things that our ideas copy are perceived not by sense but by some internal faculty of the soul such as •reason or •memory. I would be interested to know what arguments •reason gives you for the existence of your ‘real things’ or material objects; or whether you •remember seeing them formerly not as copied by your ideas but as they are in themselves; or if you have heard or read of anyone else who did!</p> |   |
| <b>Section 10</b> |       |  |   |
| 10                | 25-26 | <p><b>Phil:</b> So you’re forced by your own principles to deny the reality of sensible things, because you made it consist in an absolute existence outside the mind. That is to say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have met my target, which was to show that your principles lead to scepticism.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> I wonder what more you would require in order to be perfectly convinced. Haven’t you been free to explain yourself in any way you liked? Were any little conversational slips held against you? Weren’t you allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had previously said, as best served your purpose? Hasn’t everything you could say been heard and examined with</p>   | <p>Hylas can’t think of any more arguments to counter Philonous statement. His statement is that Hylas’ materialist philosophy leads to skepticism more than Philonous’ immaterialist philosophy does.</p> <p>Hylas needs more time to think, and agrees to meet the next morning. That meeting will constitute the Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. In that next dialogue,</p> |

## Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

| Section | Page | Text  | Comment |
|---------|------|---|---------|
|         |      | <p>all the fairness imaginable? In a word, haven't you on every point been convinced out of your own mouth? And if you can now discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining tactic, any new distinction, shading, or comment whatsoever, why don't you produce it?</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so bewildered to see myself entangled, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have led me into, that I can't be expected to find my way out on the spur of the moment. You must give me time to look around me, and recollect myself.</p> <p><b>Phil:</b> Listen—isn't that the college-bell? Let us go in, and meet here again tomorrow morning. In the mean time you can think about this morning's conversation, and see if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself.</p> <p><b>Hyl:</b> Agreed.</p> |         |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

## Synopsis of the Second Dialogue

By the end, Hylas is reduced to a state of skepticism.

| Second Dialogue SECTION | - On mind, matter and causation -<br>SPECIFIC TOPIC   |
|-------------------------|---|
| 1                       | Our perceptions cannot be explained by brain traces.  |
| 2                       | The reality of the sensible world is too clear to warrant skepticism  |
| 3                       | And provides a proof for the existence of God   |
| 4                       | Hylas and Philonous agree that God can't be denied (this was 300 years in 1713!), but Hyls says that matter is a secondary cause after God, and Philonous argues against this |
| 5                       | Nor a causal instrument, part 1   |
| 6                       | Nor a causal instrument, part 2 (God doesn't need an instrument)  |
| 7                       | Nor an "unknown somewhat"   |
| 8                       | Not necessary to maintain the reality of things   |
| 9                       | Nor even possible   |

# Study Guide to Dialogue 1 – Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous”

--Greg Goode

## Synopsis of the Third Dialogue

By the end, Hylas comes to agree with Philonous’ immaterialism.

| Third Dialogue SECTION | - Objections and replies - SPECIFIC TOPIC   |
|------------------------|---|
| 1                      | <b>Introduction:</b> More about materialism, immaterialism and skepticism   |
| <b>Objections</b>      |   |
| 2                      | Immaterialism rejects matter but keeps mind   |
| 3                      | It conflicts with common sense  |
| 4                      | It goes against language  |
| 5                      | It takes away physical causes   |
| 6                      | It makes God the author of sin  |
| 7                      | It is repugnant to common sense   |
| 8                      | It cannot explain illusions   |
| 9                      | It differs only verbally from materialism   |
| 10                     | It makes God imperfect since it makes God suffer pain   |
| 11                     | It does not consider scientific truths  |
| 12                     | It makes God a deceiver   |
| 13                     | It introduces dangerous innovations   |
| 14                     | It changes all things into ideas  |
| 15                     | It absurdly supposes that no two senses can “perceive” the same quality   |
| 16                     | It absurdly supposes that no two people can perceive the same thing   |
| 17                     | It retains the unintelligible concept “in the mind”   |
| 18                     | It can’t explain the Biblical account of creation   |
| <b>Conclusions</b>     |   |
| 19                     | The advantages of immaterialism in religion, morals, metaphysics and mathematics  |
| 20                     | Immaterialism is agreeable to common sense and remote from skepticism   |
| 21                     | Fallacies in the preceding objections   |
| 22                     | The substance of immaterialism = it unites two views: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The commonsense view (that what we sense are real things)</li> <li>2. The view of the philosophers (that the objects of sense are ideas in the mind)</li> </ol> |